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ABSTRACT

Dumping of wastes into the ocean has gone on for years
especially in the New York Bight.

The National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

is mandated by Title II of

the Ocean Dumping Act of 1972 to investigate the effects of
ocean dumping on the marine environment.

However, there is

a perception within Congress, the pUblic and other agencies
that NOAA is not meeting it's responsibilities with regard
to ocean dumping research.
The effectiveness of NOAA's ocean dumping policies and
programs and the difficulties in implementation experienced
by the agency are evaluated by applying George Edwards'
theory of policy implementation.

According to this theory,

four factors - communications, resources, dispositions and
bureaucratic structure - are critical in understanding the
implementation process.

In this case stUdy, NOAA's present

lack of participation in the ocean dumping issue can be
analyzed by examining the historical events of the past
twenty years as they apply to the policy implementation
theory.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Dumping of wastes into the ocean has gone on for years
especially in the New York Bight.

The National oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), as the federal
government's primary source of data and information
concerning problems of the ocean and atmosphere, has a
responsibility to investigate man's introduction of wastes
into the marine environment.

This has been mandated not

only in the agency's mission' but also by Title II of the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. 2
However, perceptions within Congress, the pUblic, other
agencies and within NOAA itself are that NOAA is not meeting
its responsibilities with regard to ocean dumping research.
There are three major questions that arise in this
discussion.
shaped?

How have NOAA's ocean dumping policies been

What difficulties have arisen in the implementation

of those research policies?

Finally, how have these

difficulties shaped NOAA's present role in the ocean dumping
situation?

As the science of ocean dumping evolved and

impacted the regulatory process, confusion was created as to
NOAA's role in both processes.

This paper, therefore, will

examine NOAA's policies (science or regulatory?) and the
resultant implementation by using a theory developed by
George Edwards in his book Implementing Public Policy.3

Edwards believes that four factors influence effective
policy development and implementation.

These are

communications, resources, dispositions and bureaucratic
structure.

This study of NOAA will examine the scientific

and historical events relating to ocean dumping as they
apply to the above factors in the context of Edwards'
theory.

The format of this paper will include a discussion

of Edwards' theory followed by an overview of ocean dumping
and the historical events that shaped NOAA's policies.
Finally, the development and implementation of NOAA's
policies will be analyzed using each of Edwards' factors as
they apply to this case study.

NOTES
1. Robert G. Fleagle, "NOAA's Role and the National Interest",
Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol. II, John Wiley and Sons,
spring 1986
2. Public Law 92-532: Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972" (hereafter "Ocean Dumping Act")
3.
George
C.
Edwards
III,
Implementing
Public
Policy,
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980 (hereafter, "Edwards").
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CHAPTER II
OCEANOGRAPHIC AND DUMPSITE BACKGROUND

A discussion of ocean dumping cannot be complete
without a basic description of the oceanographic
characteristics of the New York Bight and the dumpsites
contained within it.

Although the Bight is a receptacle for

the disposal of dredge spoils, construction debris (commonly
called cellar dirt) and industrial wastes, for purposes of
this discussion ocean dumping refers only to sewage sludge
generated by municipal sewage treatment plants and dumped at
the 12 and 106-Mile dumpsites.

The New York Bight and 12-Mile Dumpsite
The New York Bight extends from Delaware Bay to the
eastern end of Long Island and out to the 200 meter depth
contour.

The Bight's apex, where since 1924 most of the

ocean dumping has taken place, is an area bounded to the
south by 40° north latitude, to the east by 73°15' west
longitude, on the north by the Long Island shore, and on the
west by the New Jersey shore.'

Until 1986 when the phase-

in of sludge dumping at the 106-mile site began, all of the
sewage sludge generated by New York city and surrounding
municipalities was dumped at the 12-mile dumpsite. 2

This

area (Fig. 1) is located twelve miles east of Sandy Hook,
New Jersey on the east slope of the Christiaensen Basin in
3

relatively shallow water (less than 25 fathoms).
Circulation of the water in this portion of the inner
New York Bight is strongly influenced by that of the whole
Bight (Montauk Pt. to Cape May) and by that of the Middle
Atlantic Bight (Nantucket Shoals to Cape Hatteras).
However, there are some local influences which have
significant effects on the circulation, principally the
bathymetric configuration of this corner of the Bight and
the flow from the Hudson-Raritan estuary.3
Water mass properties of this portion of the Bight are
influenced by circulation, weather and effluent reaching the
coastal marine waters.

Besides the dumping of wastes,

contaminants enter the water column by way of estuarine
effluents and atmospheric fallout. 4

The 106-Mile Dumpsite
The 106-mile dumpsite is a deep ocean dumpsite located
between 38°40 'N to 39°00'N and 72°00'W to 72°30W or
approximately 106 mile southeast of Sandy Hook, New Jersey
(Fig. 1).

The site is seaward of the continental shelf

break and water depths range from 1000 to 1400 fathoms.
site was used predominantly for dumping of acid and
alkaline-based industrial wastes from 1961 to 1987. 5
Presently, no industrial concerns hold permits for
industrial waste dumping.

As of December 1987 all sewage

sludge originally dumped at the 12-mile site began to be
4

The

dumped at the l06-mile site. 6
Oceanographic conditions at the l06-mile site are
variable, depending upon the water mass occupying the site.
Slope water is the predominant water mass, however, shelf
water incursions do occur, especially in the spring when
fresh water runoff and wind forcing cause offshore movement
of the shelf/slope front.

Northward meandering of the Gulf

Stream can cause Gulf Stream water to invade the site
although this phenomenon is rare.

More commonly, warm core

rings may traverse the region from northeast to southwest,
aperiodically bringing strong currents and Gulf Stream or
Sargasso Sea water to the site.?
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NOTES
1. United States, National Marine Fisheries Service, "Response of
the Habitat and Biota of the Inner New York Bight to the Abatement
of Sewage Sludge Dumping - Progress Report, July 1986 -June 1987",
1987
2. Edward D. Santoro, "Status Report - Phase Out of Ocean Dumping
of Sewage Sludge in the New York Bight Apex", Marine Pollution
Bulletin 18: 1987 pp.278-280
3.
Memorandum
Branch, National
Oceanography of
(hereafter cited
4.

from M. C. Ingham, chief, Physical oceanography
Marine Fisheries Service, "Summary of the Physical
the Inner New York Bight ll dated 12 June
1986
IIIngham Memoli) .

Ingham memo, page 2

5.
United States, Environmental Protection Agency,
"Draft
Monitoring Plan for the 106-Mile Deepwater Municipal Sludge Site",
1986 (draft) pp. 13-14.
6.
Kenneth W. Barton, IIReport of Water Masses Receiving Wastes
from Ocean Dumping at the 106-mile Dumpsite: October 1, 1986
through September 30, 1987. II Data Analysis Product 24, December
1987, NMFS/NOAA
7.

Ibid., p . 1
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CHAPTER III
PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION THEORY

Edwards describes pUblic pOlicy implementation as the
stage of policyrnaking between establishment of a policy and
the consequences of the policy for the people it affects'.
If the objective of a pOlicy is to alleviate a problem and
the results are unsuccessful it may be a fault of either the
policy or the implementation of that policy.
both.

Often it is

In the case of ocean dumping, the establishment of

policy culminated in the passage of the Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (also known as the
Ocean Dumping Act) and the enactment of the related
regulations.

While Congress had originally intended to

phase out ocean dumping in five years, the difficulties
faced by NOAA, as the science agency, and EPA, as the
regulatory agency, in the implementation of that policy may
have contributed to the continuation of ocean dumping
today.2
The four factors Edwards believes influence effective
policy and implementation are communication, resources,
dispositions and bureaucratic structure and each are
discussed below.

8

COMMUNICATIONS
The first requirement for effective policy
implementation is ensuring that those who are to carry out
policy know what they are supposed to do.

This might entail

Congress passing laws that are clear in their intent so that
misunderstandings by the implementors are avoided.
similarly, this same type of clarity of communication is
important within the confines of an agency or office.
Disagreements and misunderstandings about policies can lead
to distortion of communications within all levels of
government.

Lack of clarity in policymaking can also result

from ambiguous court decisions, pUblic opposition, competing
goals and unfamiliarity with new programs.

All these

factors can upset communications and in turn restrict
implementation. 3
Decentralization of bureaucracy often leads to
communication difficulties.

The more steps there are in the

implementation process, the more likely it is that the
policy will be watered down. 4

In the case of ocean

dumping, the 1972 law mandated the involvement of no less
than four federal agencies in the implementation of the
country's first ocean dumping policy.5
Finally, lack of consistency between lawmaking and
sUbsequent implementation orders can result in confusing
results. 6

Environmental policymaking in the Reagan
9

administration has largely ignored congressional intent,
judicial standards and public preferences. 7

Therefore,

when implementors receive inconsistent instructions, they
will inevitably be unable to meet all the demands made upon
them.

RESOURCES
Implementation orders may be accurately transmitted in
a clear and consistent manner but if implementors lack the
resources to carry out the policies, implementation is
likely to be ineffective.

Resources are traditionally

thought of as funding, staffing and skills B but as seen in
the case of ocean dumping good information on inputs (i.e.
what and how much is being dumped where)9 is as important a
resource to the decisionmaking process.

Unfortunately, the

four limiting resources are often interrelated.

without

enough staff or funding an agency cannot acquire the
necessary information to accurately implement policy.

The

ability of NOAA to supply this needed resource is the major
question of this section.
Because of the complexities involved in the bUdgetary
and personnel processes of the government I intend to
briefly touch on this aspect of the resource problem as it
relates to policy implementation.

10

DISPOSITIONS
In effective policy implementation, the implementors
must not only know what to do and have the resources
available, they must also have the desire to carry out a
policy.

Differing attitudes and perspectives exist in all

levels of government, from top decisionmakers down to
individual bureaucratic units and these, in turn, affect
policy at various points.'o
Bureaucratic units may disagree over responsibility for
an activity thus hindering implementation.

During the early

years of the ocean dumping controversy the competitive
atmosphere between NOAA and EPA made it difficult for the
two agencies to follow out the mandate set forth in the
Ocean Dumping Act."

Although specific departments within

each agency worked closely and well together (for example
EPA's region II office and NOAA's MESA) there was tension in
Washington as the two agencies competed for the various
responsibilities and limited funds.'z
The mission of a specific agency mandated to carry out
a policy may conflict with that policy.

An example of

dispositional problems can be seen between various
departments within NOAA during the early 1980's when NOAA
ocean dumping policy changed from protection of the ocean to
a belief that under certain circumstances, ocean dumping was
a viable alternative to the sewage sludge disposal issue. 13
11

BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE
The prominent characteristics of bureaucracies, namely
standard operating procedures (SOP's) and fragmentation, are
seen by Edwards as possible deterrents to effective policy
implementation.

SOP's are defined as routines to help

pUblic officials to make numerous everyday decisions.
However, SOP's can inhibit change and are often obstacles to
action.

Fragmentation is described as the dispersion of

responsibility for a policy area among several
organizational units.

It can lead to diffusion of

responsibility and can make coordination of policies
difficul t. 14
In the context of NOAA'S involvement in the ocean
dumping issue, the inherent problems of bureaucratic
structure have played a significant role.

From the Marine

Ecosystem Analysis project (MESA) to the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), the fragmentation of NOAA has
contributed to its inability to meet its responsibilities.
Similarly, interagency problems existed between NOAA and EPA
as both agencies struggled with the difficulties of a new
policy.15

12

NOTES
1.

Edwards, p. 1

2. Philip M. Cohen, "Evolution of NOAA Policies on Ocean Dumping",
December 1986, OAD/NOS/NOAA (hereafter, "NOAA Policies")
3.

Edwards, p. 17-19

4.

ibid., p. 20

5.

Ocean Dumping Act

6.

Edwards, pp. 40-42

7.
M.E. Kraft and N.J. Vig, "Environmental Policy in the Reagan
Presidency'" Political science Quarterly, Vol. 99, No.3, Fall 1984
8.

Edwards, p. 53

9. Richard H. Burroughs, "Ocean Dumping - Information and Policy
Development in the USA", Marine Policy, Vol. 12, No.2, April 1988
pp. 96-104
10.

Edwards, pp. 89-97

11.
Telephone conversation with Kenneth Kamlet, previously with
the National wildlife Federation, in April 1988.
12. Personal communication with Dr. R. Lawrence Swanson, Director,
Waste Management Institute, State University of New York at stony
Brook, in February 1988.
13.

NOAA Policies Report, see note 1, p. 10

14.

Edwards, pp. 125-134

15.

communication with Swanson, also see Note 1.
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CHAPTER IV
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Public policies result from sequences of decisions
based on political decisions and legislative mandates often
as a result of social and executive pressure.

Environmental

policymaking is not only governed by those factors, but by
natural and man-induced events and by scientific findings.
In examining NOAA's ocean dumping policies it can be shown
that all of the above factors have either contributed to or
inhibited the implementation of that policy'.

This chapter

discusses, chronologically, the significant events that have
shaped NOAA's policies in preparation for the analysis of
implementation processes in the following chapter.

The Early 1970's
In the late 1960's an increasing awareness of the need
to strengthen the federal government's marine biological and
technological capabilities led to a presidential commission
recommending a unified agency to oversee the oceans and
atmosphere. 2

NOAA was formed by executive order in 1970 by

President Richard Nixon3 and encompassed such agencies as
the National Weather Service, Coast and Geodetic Survey,
Bureau of Sport Fishing and Wildlife (parts of which were

14

incorporated into the National Marine Fisheries Service) and
others.
NOAA was barely a year old when furor over a report on
conditions of the New York Bight thrust the agency into the
public eye.

The paper, called the "Sandy Hook Report" was

prepared for the u.S. Corps of Engineers by the Sandy Hook
Marine Laboratory to examine the effects of dredge spoil and
sewage sludge dumping in the inner New York Bight.

The

results of the study showed that conditions in the Bight
were polluted enough that no macrofauna could exist in
dumpsite areas (including both sewage sludge and dredge
spoil areas)4 and that a "dead sea"s had been created in
the area.

Disagreements ensued between agencies,

politicians and the pUblic over the significance of the
report and the actual degradation of the Bight and created
controversy that led to congressional investigations and new
Leq i.s Lat.i on".

During this same period the Food and Drug
Administration banned shellfishing in the inner New York
Bight (Fig. 2).

The FDA's decision was based on total and

fecal coliform bacteria levels which exceeded those
recommended by the Federal Water Pollution Control
Administration for estuarine waters used for shellfish
harvesting and cUltivation?

These findings were in part

taken from the "Sandy Hook Report
done by the Sandy Hook Lab.
15
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and from other studies
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Fig. 2.

Depth In meter.

Location of the 12-mile sewage sludge
dumpsite, dredge materials dumpsite and
area closed to commercial shellfishing
in 1970 in the NY BightB
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In response to the ongoing controversy in the New York
Bight and in recognition of the global impacts of ocean
disposal of wastes, the President's Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) issued it's 1970 report, "Ocean Dumping: A
National policy,,9.

This report stated "[i]f no action is

taken and ocean dumping continues to increase, the long term
damage to the marine environment will be great.

,,10

These

strong words not only set the tone for the national policy
of the early 1970's, they also embodied the growing belief
at the time that the oceans were to be protected and that
dumping was a temporary stop-gap measure to be eliminated as
rapidly as possible 11.
As a direct result of the CEQ Report Congress enacted
The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
(MPRSA).

The Ocean Dumping Act, as it is more commonly

referred to, in Title I directed the Environmental
Protection Agency and Corps of Engineers to establish and
implement regulatory programs for ocean dumping.

Title II

required EPA and NOAA to conduct comprehensive research and
monitoring regarding the effects of ocean dumping and to
investigate and study alternative disposal methods 12 •

The

agencies were also to determine methods of minimizing or
ending as soon as possible the ocean disposal of any
"material which may unreasonably degrade or endanger human
health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment,
ecological systems, or economic potentialities .... " 13 •
17

Already recognizing the need to study the effects of
human interference in marine environments, NOAA had created
the Marine Ecosystem Analysis Project (MESA) in early 1973.
The program's goals were 1) to establish an environmental
baseline, 2)

to monitor, predict, and support efforts to

control conditions that degrade the environment and 3) to
alert responsible officials of the onset of environmental
change 14 •

The New York Bight was selected for MESA's five

year pilot program because of it's acute environmental
problems but was considered independent of NOAA's
requirements under Title II of the Ocean Dumping Act 15 •
Other areas such as Prince William Sound and Puget Sound
were considered as likely sites for MESA studies after the
completion of the pilot program 16 •
Not only a scientific data collection and analysis
program, the MESA/New York Bight Project also provided
funding for other research that would identify and answer
pertinent environmental questions about the New York Bight.
More importantly, perhaps, the Project was responsible for
the synthesis of the available information about the Bight,
putting it into a form that could be used by those
developing policy and regulations.

The original intent of

the project was to focus on the Bight as an ecosystem, that
is, look at physical and biological processes and
anthropogenic effects on those processes.

Ocean dumping was

seen as only one aspect of the Bight's dynamics 1?
18

In 1973 all this changed.

Dr. William H. Harris, a

geochemist from Brooklyn College announced findings that
sewage sludge dumped at the 12-mile site was, over the three
years of his study, working it's way inshore toward Long
Island beaches 18 •

National interest was sparked by

newspaper articles describing an uninterested and
unconcerned EPA and threats of a IIsludge monster ll defiling
Long Island1s south shore beaches 19 •
In the middle of all this controversy was NOAA's MESA
program.

Dr. Larry Swanson, director of the MESA program,

testified at an EPA pUblic hearing that there were
potentially deleterious effects from sewage sludge and
indicated an lIurgency and importance (in] determining more
accurately the extent of sludge contamination, the oceanic
factors influencing sludge movement, and the extent to which
sludge is impacting or jeopardizing marine life and
beaches.lI~

His conClusion, though, regarding likelihood

of sewage sludge migration of towards shore, was
understandably vague due to the fact that there was little
information available at that time to make any jUdgments 21 •
These determinations, arguably inconclusive, were used by
both EPA and the opponents of ocean dumping to argue their
respective cases and brought NOAA into odds with both
factions.

As a result of it1s role as IIscientific expert ll

,

and with the increased congressional and media attention,
NOAA was forced to place more focus on the NY Bight Project
19

sewage sludge work and less on the original intent of the
MESA program22 •
In response to the increased controversy and negative
scientific data EPA decided that sludge should be dumped
further offshore.

In 1974, NOAA was called upon to find two

possible sites and reluctantly examined sites between 28 and
70 miles offshore.

Eventually NOAA decided upon one 60

miles offshore although it was never considered by NOAA to
be a viable alternative to the 12-mile site.

EPA

established a deadline of July 1976 for cessation of dumping
at the 12-mile site and earlier if the findings of Dr.
Harris were proven true.

All dumping would be moved to the

60-mile site until December 1981 at which time all dumping
would cease.

NOAA continued to oppose EPA's decisions

regarding the offshore site and when MESA was able to prove
that sludge was not, in fact, migrating shoreward, EPA
rescinded it's plans for the alternate sites.

By now it was

clear NOAA's findings and decisions had become integral in
shaping EPA's policies and regulations and in congressional
and pUblic investigations into the ocean dumping issue 23 •
Renewed controversy erupted in 1976 after a series of
"floatable" incidents fouled the Long Island south shore.
The resultant beach closures fueled pUblic outrage and
required the New York Bight Project to once again respond to
heightened media and political attention.

These episodes

were quickly attributed to a series of isolated events in
20

Bight area and within seven months an in-depth analysis was
available to the pUblic.

This quick response was credited

to the directed attention of the NY Bight Project and it's
growing understanding of the complexities of the New York
Bight~.

The second incident of the summer of 1976 illustrated
that there was still much to learn about the processes at
work in the region.

A massive fish kill along the New

Jersey coast clearly identified the potential impact of
human interference in the marine environment.

The event

offered the NY Bight Project the opportunity to study oxygen
depletion conditions and raised difficult scientific
questions regarding anthropogenic versus natural occurrences
of this type.

While this large scale event was determined

to be of natural origins, similar pollution-related smaller
scale events illustrated the risks to the Bight.

Subsequent

MESA reports contributed greatly to the understanding of
oxygen depletion conditions. 25

1977 to 1981
The year 1977 was a confusing yet significant time for
the formulation and implementation of NOAA ocean dumping
policy.

For five years (since the 1972 passage of the Ocean

Dumping Act) NOAA's ocean dumping programs had remained
unfunded.

All work was carried out under other programs and

authorizations.

Finally, NOAA's FY 1977 bUdget included
21

approximately $1.4 million dollars for ocean dumping
research and monitoring 26 •

with this funding NOAA

established the Ocean Dumping Program whose vague goals were
to assist EPA by providing data for dumpsite analysis and
support of that agency's regulatory process as mandated by
Title II of the Ocean Dumping Act 27 •

This department was a

separate entity from the MESA/NY Bight Program.
NOAA ocean dumping research continued in the NY Bight in
1977.

MESA/NY Bight Project findings indicated little

improvement would result in the Bight if ocean dumping were
stopped, especially if no action took place to control other
pollutants input.

It also strongly opposed any movement of

sludge dumping to another continental shelf site but
considered the 106-mile site suitable for emergency dumping.
(This actually took place in 1977 and 1978 when Camden, New
Jersey was forced to dispose of its sludge at the offshore
site .)

Another branch of NOAA, the National Ocean Service

(NOS), had been conducting surveys at the 106-mile site to
determine baseline environmental conditions since industrial
wastes had been dumped there for years and little was known
about the area~.
Concern was growing about the likelihood of actually
"getting out of the ocean" since the search for viable
alternatives to ocean dumping was proving fruitless.

NOAA

was not involved in research into alternatives since most
were land-based and fell under EPA's purview.
22

Even though

the 1977 amendments to the Ocean Dumping Act reaffirmed
congressional intent to end ocean dumping that unreasonably
degraded the marine environment by December 1981, the once
protectionist attitude of the government as a result of a
strict interpretation of the law was now in a state of
reappraisal.

A change in the research focus at the 106-mile

site in 1977 and 1978 illustrated these changing attitudes.
Baseline environmental studies were replaced by
investigations into broader use of the site for ocean
disposal~.

The Ocean Dumping Act's call for "off-the-

shelf sites whenever possible" provided a mandate for this
action and a possible viable alternative to the 12-mile
site.

Concern within the Congress and the scientific

community over the unknowns of dumping in the deeper ocean
were outweighed by the known deterioration of the inshore
dumpsites and the resultant desire to end the contribution
to that degradation.

EPA's new permit renewal process

reflected this change in policy by allowing continued ocean
dumping based on need, status of available alternatives and
an acceptable plan for phase-out within the time frame of
the law.

NOAA's 1977 policy, although still in a state of

flux, was modified to parallel these changes:
"1.
It is NOAA policy to oppose ocean disposal of
sewage sludge; the agency endorses EPA's policy to
terminate this dumping by 1981.
2. NOAA shall continue to oppose moving the existing
sewage sludge dumpsite in the New York Bight on the
basis that to date we have developed no conclusive
evidence that dumping at that site has resulted in
23

threat to public health or a danger to local beaches.
However, as dumping at that location continues, such a
threat could materialize, necessitating rapid
relocation. We believe that the problem of sewage
sludge dumping in the New York Bight should be resolved
in the framework of the Interstate Sanitation
commission's Sewage Sludge Disposal Management Plan.
However, in the event EPA makes the decision to move
that dumpsite, and the choices are either DWD-106 or
the 60-mile site, then NOAA favors the use of DWD-106
in order to avoid despoiling a new area.
3. NOAA will not oppose any interim permits issued
by EPA to allow dumping of sewage sludge at DWD-106 on
a temporary basis by the cities of Philadelphia or
Camden in order to allow those municipalities time to
develop their rcroposed land-based disposal
alternatives." 0
All of these changes, though, were still governed by the
December 1981 deadline.

The use of the oceans for dumping

of certain substances was only seen as the best disposal
option for the immediate future.
The passage in 1978 of the National Ocean Pollution
Planning Act (NOPPA) mandated the establishment of NOAA's
National Marine Pollution Program.

The focus of this new

program was to:
- prepare and update every three years a comprehensive
five-year plan for the overall Federal effort in ocean
pollution research, development,and monitoring (Section
4) ;

- provide financial assistance for such activities if
they received high priority in the five-year plan and
are not being addressed adequately by any existing
Federal programs (Section 6);
- establish a comprehensive, coordinated, and effective
ocean pollution research, development, and monitoring
program (Section 5);
- insure that results, findings, and monitoring
programs are disseminated in a timely manner and useful
form to Federal and user groups having an interest in
24

such information (section 8)

.31

Programs such as the status and Trends Program, National
Shellfish Register and Consequences of contaminants Program
emerged later as a result of this legislation.

All had

similar goals as the original MESA program but with more
directed objectives.

While the MESA/NY Bight Project

continued to address the very specific issues of ocean
dumping in the New York Bight this legislation intended to
bring a more national focus to NOAA ocean pollution
research, development, and monitoring programs 32 •

The

NOPPA legislation also resulted in the establishment of the
Office of Marine Pollution Assessment (OMPA) at NOAA
headquarters in Rockville, Maryland.

The goals of this

program were the same as the legislation and brought NOAA in
line with the new law.

Since ocean dumping was included,

the Ocean Dumping Program was incorporated into this
department.
In September 1979, the NY Bight Project field
operations ended after almost seven years, two years longer
than the

original intent.

In that time, though, the

program was responsible for collecting more information
about the New York Bight than any other program of its type.
It contributed greatly to the establishment of federal ocean
dumping policy and regulations and was highly regarded for
it's research results regarding both ocean dumping and other
environmental processes at work in the New York Bight33 •
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with the end of the NY Bight Project NOAA transferred
the MESA program to NOAA headquarters under OMPA.

In 1981

the MESA program officially ended and it's responsibilities
and mission objectives were absorbed into OMPA.

No other

estuaries were studied by this program as had been
originally envisioned when MESA was formed in 1973.

During

this same period, NOAA administrator, John Byrne, attempted
to move the Ocean Dumping Program to Seattle, Washington, a
move that was presented as an attempt to strengthen NOAA's
pollution programs in the northwest. Congressional
disapproval prevented it from happening and later that year,
OMPA was reorganized into Ocean Assessments Division (OAD),
a department that continues today (Fig. 4)

.34

Two events in 1981 contributed significantly to the
future direction of federal and program ocean dumping
policies.

The first was the National Committee on Oceans

and Atmosphere (NACOA) report titled "The Role of the Ocean
in a Waste Management Strategy".

The report recommended a

"multimedia" approach to the disposal of wastes with an
emphasis on a determination of costs versus benefit or risk.
The report specifically recommended that EPA reverse its
policy that no ocean dumping permit be issued when a landbased alternative exists.

It went on to say that ocean

dumping by barge or outfall should be allowed to continue in
areas where no unreasonable degradation has resulted if
appropriate conditions existed and there was adherence to
26
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adequate safeguards and monitoring practices.

It advised

EPA to consider the cost and feasibility of land-based
alternatives versus those of ocean disposal and determine
the relative risk of either to the degradation of the
environment and to human health.

This report, therefore,

encouraged policy and management decisions be made in the
context of risk assessment and with a less strict
interpretation of the applicable laws~.
The second event of 1981 responsible for a change in
policy was the jUdicial decision made by Federal JUdge
Abraham Sofaer in CITY OF NEW YORK v. EPA. 37

Since 1973,

New York City's sewage sludge had failed to meet EPA's
environmental impact criteria for a special permit to be
disposed of at sea.

This was because the levels of PCB's,

hydrocarbons, and other pollutants exceeded EPA standards.
New York city had, nevertheless, been dumping using an
interim special permit which allows waste to be dumped at
sea even though it violates the criteria for the special
permit and if there is no land-based alternative for
disposal.

In 1980 EPA denied New York's application for an

interim permit based on the new stricter regulations imposed
since 1977.

In response, New York challenged EPA's interim

permit process and evaluation criteria.

The final court

decision was in favor of New York City, stating that EPA's
criteria for determining whether New York's ocean dumping
would unreasonably degrade the marine environment,
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ecological systems and economic potentialities was
"arbitrary and capr Lc Lousv -",

The decision further stated

that the EPA must consider equally the nine statutory
criteria used to evaluate all permit applications.
Essentially, the include the environmental effect of the
proposed dumping, the need for a permit, the availability
and potential impact of alternative methods of disposal and
the effect of the proposed action on aesthetic, recreational
and economic values.~
The presumed desire of the Ocean Dumping Act was to
protect the oceans from increased degradation as a result of
ocean disposal of waste.

It also intended that EPA be

delegated broad discretion in its duty to prevent and
strictly regulate ocean dumping 4o•

The results of this

court case and the decision by EPA not to appeal Judge
Sofaer's ruling, while betraying the original intent of the
Ocean Dumping Act, more importantly, perhaps, contributed to
an emerging national policy, one of non-preferential
treatment of the ocean as a waste disposal medium 4'

.

1982-1988
The new attitudes towards ocean dumping, brought about
by the events of the previous three years, were accompanied
by increased activity in research and policy-making.

EPA

extended dumping at the 12-mile site for New York city and
six New York and New Jersey municipalities.
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NOAA-sponsored

research at the 106-mile site indicated the environmental
feasibility of dumping sewage sludge there.

Finally, some

cities (Boston, Baltimore and Washington, D.C) were
exploring the possibility of the disposal of their wastes at
sea 42 •
In May 1983, NOAA, in a major shift of policy, issued
this statement:
"Waste disposal practices should be chosen to avoid
significant risk of harm to living and nonliving
resources in any environmental medium - oceans, land,
fresh water, and air.
If it is determined that
disposal is the preferred option to a potential waste
problem, then disposal practices likely to cause least
risk of significant harm regardless of medium should be
chosen. NOAA does not oppose selection of the ocean as
a disposal site if comparative assessment of all
reasonable disposal options indicates that the ocean
option poses the least risk of significant harm.
If
disposal in the ocean is currently causing or
contributing to conditions that cause significant risk
of harm to the marine environment, NOAA urges the
timely assessment of alternative disposal practices and
the selection of an environmentally acceptable
practice. "43
This mirrored the already growing trend to include the
oceans in a waste management strategy, exactly as the NACOA
report had suggested44 •
During the same time, at a congressional hearing, NOAA
testified as to the desirability of moving dumping from the
12-mile to the 106-mile dumpsite.

In the past, NOAA had

maintained a policy that little recovery of the 12-mile site
would be observed unless the input of other pollutants was
to be halted.

Moving dumping out of the 12-mile site was

considered unwise if it meant compromising another area.
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However, new data had been collected that indicated that it
was environmentally feasible to dump sewage sludge at the
deeper dumpsite.

These included:

- dumped sewage sludge could be diluted by a factor of
10 4 within a few minutes and 105 within a day;
- laboratory and field experiments do not find
significant low level effects at these concentrations;
- there would be negligible benthic effects;
- the concentration and distribution of contaminants
would not be such as to cause much accumulation in
migratory or residence fish, although a few
contaminants
(e.g. PCBs) in sewage sludge probably
contribute to bioaccumulation; and
- there would be no apparent threat to human health. 45
NOAA testified that it's newest policy, based on the above
information, meant that it not only favored use of the deep
water site over the 60-mile site (EPA had begun to consider
this site again) it also favored it above the 12-mile
site~.

From 1983 to 1985 investigations into transferring
sewage sludge disposal to the 106-mile site continued.

The

result was that in April 1985 EPA issued a final denial of
petitions to re-designate the 12-mile site along with a
request that the nine municipalities still dumping at the
12-mile site transfer their operations to the 106-mile site .
The principal factor in this decision was that if dumping at
the 12-mile site were to continue in the manner that would
meet the limited permissible concentrations requirements it
had the potential for creating navigational hazards.
31

In

addition, it was shown that the primary source for sewagerelated contaminants found in the Christiansen Basin and
ocean floor north of the site to within five nautical miles
south of Long Island was a result of ocean dumping of sludge
at the inshore site.

Along with the continued closure of

shellfishing beds in the area, increased levels above the
normal ambient levels of heavy metals and halogenated
hydrocarbons were observed at the site.

An orderly 1 1/2

year phase-out schedule was negotiated with the dumpers the
controlling factor being the lack of ocean-going barges
necessary for transport of the sludge to the offshore site
required a 1 1/2 year step-wise schedule 47 •

Completion of

the change-over to the 106-mile site was accomplished on
December 31, 1987.
Since early 1988, controversy has once again erupted
over ocean dumping.

Fishermen claim that catch totals are

down and the incidence of disease in shellfish is on the
increase in the northeast as a result of environmental
degradation from dumping at the offshore site.

Coastal

communities are angered over episodes of medical wastes
washing up on the beaches from New Jersey to Rhode Island
and incorrectly blame sewage sludge dumping.

Scientists,

baffled by large-scale occurrences of dolphin deaths along
the Atlantic coast, have looked to the disposal of wastes at
sea as a possible culprit. 48

Finally, as a result of these

events, pUblic outrage has fueled congress into amending,
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once again, the Ocean Dumping Act in an attempt to close the
loopholes that allowed for the continuation of dumping for
the last eight years.

The Present Ocean Dumping situation
The pendulum has, once again, swung back to a policy of
non-use of the oceans for waste disposal.

In response to

the renewed controversy over movement of sludge dumping to
the 106-Mile site the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988,
actually an amendment to the 1972 Ocean Dumping Act, was
produced, setting a date of December 31, 1991 for the
cessation of ocean disposal of sewage sludge and industrial
wastes.

In particular, this amendment specifically avoided

the controversy surrounding the determination of
"unreasonable degradation" and benefit and risk comparisons
of waste disposal media by banning ocean dumping outright
and making it economically infeasible to continue dumping
much beyond the cutoff date.

The key provisions include:

- No new dumpers of sewage sludge or industrial waste.
- No dumping of sewage sludge or industrial waste
without a permit and compliance or enforcement
agreement.
- Dumping fees imposed starting 270 days from the
enactment of the Act and continuing until December 31,
1991.
- Financial penalties imposed for dumping after 1991.
The fees, which are expected to be considerable, are
divided amongst EPA, NOAA, and the Coast Guard for
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monitoring, research and surveillance activities.
the fees will go to

Part of

coastal states clean ocean funds and

part will be held in trust to be returned to the dumpers to
support their development of alternatives. Probably the most
important aspect of the legislation lies in the consent
decrees that have been entered into by the dumpers stating
their plans and schedules for implementing alternatives to
ocean sludge disposal, which legally bind them to their own
plans. 49
This brings us to the present.

It is clear that

historical events have been cause for action and reaction by
both policy-makers and implementors.

The following chapter

examines in depth those responses that have affected NOAA's
role, politically and scientifically, as it relates to the
ocean dumping issue.
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CHAPTER V
NOAA POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS

Establishment of public policy can be in many forms,
such as the passage of a legislative act, the issuance of an
executive order, the handing down of a judicial decision or
the promulgation of a regulatory rule.
only the first step.

However, that is

Since policies are rarely self-

executing, their implementation is left to government
agencies to establish programs or regulations to carry out
the policy.

Unfortunately, this process is difficult and

the end result may differ greatly from the original intent
of the law or policy.'
The inhibition of effective policy implementation can
be explained by George Edwards theory, as discussed in
Chapter 2.

The four factors that can impede the policy

process are:
1. Communication - Lack of or unclear communication
disrupts policy implementation.
For example,
communication difficulties can result from laws and
judicial decisions that lack clarity. They can exist
between heads of departments and their employees or
between collaborating agencies.
2. Resources - If those responsible for carrying out
pOlicy lack the resources to do so, policy
implementation will suffer.
For this paper, resources
are defined as funding, information, and authority.
3. Dispositions - In effective policy implementation,
the implementors must have the desire to carry out a
policy.
Disagreements within or between agencies can
disrupt the implementation process.
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4.
Bureaucratic structure - The structure of
bureaucracies, namely standard operating procedures and
fragmentation can constrain implementation by
inhibiting change and diffusing responsibility.
NOAA is the federal government's primary source of data
and information concerning problems of the ocean and
atmosphere.

This section examines the specific issue of

NOAA's involvement in the implementation of ocean dumping
policy and discusses the agency's own implementation process
as it has been shaped by both the intensely controversial
events of the past twenty years and their relation to
Edwards theory.

Policy Implementation Difficulties in the Early 1970's
The fledgling NOAA, in the midst of administrative
uncertainty, had little or no bureaucratic structure in
place to link the already existing environmental programs
now under it's purview not to mention develop any new
programs.

The ocean dumping issue, both politically and

scientifically challenging, was only one of many faced by
the new agency.
An early example of both dispositional and
communication difficulties surrounding the ocean dumping
issue arose between the Corps of Engineers and the Sandy
Hook Marine Lab over the "Sandy Hook Report".

In 1968, the

Corps commissioned the then u.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
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Laboratory at Sandy Hook to study the dumpsites in the New
York Bight (the Corps was, at the time, the closest thing to
a coastal ocean agency; its responsibilities included
maintaining the navigability of u.S. waters).

The purpose

of the report, supposedly, was to help the Corps determine
the advisability of continuing dumping operations at the
present disposal site.

The study was to take two years and

was to assess the ecology of the site by performing chemical
analyses of the water and sediments and pelagic and benthic
studies.
The 1970 report indicated that the dumpsite areas were
severely degraded, a fact that, seemingly, the Corps was
unprepared to accept.

Nor was it prepared to deal with the

controversy the report created 2 •

In an attempt to minimize

the negative impact the COE characterized the report as
"tentative, incomplete and sUbject to change"3.

Further,

in an interview for BIOSCIENCE, Kenneth Osborne, a COE staff
marine biologist, stated that "the competence of Sandy Hook
is only in fishery biological research.

The Corps only

wrote one contract with Sandy Hook ... they tried their best
hydrographically but what is needed now is the highest type
of physical oceanography."

When asked why the Sandy Hook

Lab was chosen in the first place, he stated "Sandy Hook was
chosen because they had their own vessels and the Corps
would not have to pay for the purchase of such vessels by
another organization.

[The Corps] would only have to pay
40

for the cost of using vessels and not the cost of
purchasing.

"4

Since no policy existed, either within the

lab or at the federal level, the Sandy Hook Lab could only
react by defending its studies both to the Corps and to an
outraged pUblic (a pattern that has seemed to exist ever
since) .
The above example illustrates how differences in the
organizational viewpoints (dispositions) and unclear
communications can impede effective policy development and
implementation.

specifically to ocean dumping, however, the

early controversy with the COE (as a result of the report)
contributed to a somewhat defensive posture that was
necessary for NOAA to maintain in regard to it's ocean
dumping research.

The Sandy Hook Lab was a fisheries

biology research facility, wholly interested in the study of
habitat, predation, life cycles and the many other aspects
of marine life.

The Corps' focus was on construction and

maintenance of marine engineering projects and it had little
experience dealing with environmental impacts of these
projects especially ocean dumpsites.
similarly, it was not surprising that communication
difficulties also would arise between two agencies with
vastly different missions.

Edwards states that one of the

pitfalls of communication is lack of clarity: transmitted
instructions are vague and often do not specify when or how
a program is to be carried outs.
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This also seemed to be

part of the problem between Sandy Hook and the COE.
It is important to note that perhaps these early
events, that is, those prior to the enactment of MPRSA and
the formation of MESA, are less significant to NOAA's
present position in ocean dumping research.

However, these

patterns seem to exist throughout the next twenty years and,
as this paper examines, has contributed to many of NOAA's
problems in effectively contributing to and implementing a
national ocean dumping policy.

Implementation of The Ocean Dumping Act (MPRSA)

1972-1975

The 1970 CEQ report and the escalating controversy over
ocean dumping were, in part, responsible for the passage of
the MPRSA in 1972.

Through this legislation the country had

established a form of national ocean dumping policy.
However, NOAA, whose responsibilities under MPRSA were
significant, had distinct difficulties in those early few
years developing any kind of implementation plan.
To begin with four Federal agencies shared major
responsibilities for the overall implementation of the Ocean
Dumping Act.

Because interagency coordination was seen as

essential to this mission, the Ocean Disposal Program
Coordinating Committee was formed in April 1973 and was
comprised of EPA, NOAA, COE and the Coast Guard 6 •

This was

the first attempt to bring together four diverse
bureaucratic units in both an attempt to avoid duplication
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of research effort and, more importantly to encourage a high
order of interaction.

NOAA was charged with heading this

committee since it was also lead agency in the research and
monitoring of ocean dumping.
Unfortunately this well-intentioned effort to combine
forces was a distinct disappointment 7 •

A NOAA evaluation

described the committee as such:
"While the committee has been useful as a forum for the
exchange of ideas and discussion of common problems, it
has met infrequently and the productivity and pace of
the committee have been disappointingly low. Reliance
on the four-agency committee for speedy resolution of
substantive problems of ocean disposal is simply not
possible."B
Edwards describes two possible reasons why this
important attempt at cooperative policy implementation did
not work.

First, within most organizational units there is

often a dominant opinion about the organizations primary
mission.

Focus is placed on those functions of primary

interest leaving those considered as secondary functions
with lesser allocations of time and resources.

Secondly,

bureaucratic units often try to achieve autonomy in carrying
out their responsibilities.

For this reason they do not

want to be controlled by officials outside their
organization or to have to coordinate closely with other
organizations. 9
NOAA's attempt to develop it's own program designed to
address the legislative mandates of the Ocean Dumping Act
seemed equally as difficult.

Edwards describes the
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development of new programs:
"Often the passage of a new policy is followed by a
period of administrative uncertainty in which there is
considerable time lag before any information on
program[s] are disseminated. This period is followed
by one in which rules are made but are then changed
quickly as high-level officials attempt to deal with
the unforseen problems of implementing the policy and
of their own earlier directives. ,,10
For NOAA this process took nearly three years.

In 1975

the agency finally published its program issue paper, the
purpose of which was to:
"1) outline the program being developed under the
requirements of P.L. 92-523 [the Ocean Dumping Act],
Title II;
2) provide support and justification for the FY 77
budget request for the ocean dumping program; and
3) identify a number of issues which still require
resolution in further development of the program. ,,1 1
NOAA admitted in this document that its process was slow in
developing.

The failure of the Ocean Disposal Program

Coordinating Committee to provide coordination between
agencies left NOAA with sole responsibility for determining
areas of duplicative research as well as areas of inquiry
which were not being adequately covered, all necessarily
addressed in the new ocean dumping program.
NOAA interpreted its role of monitoring and research as
one designed to support and complement the regulatory
programs mandated by the first section of the Ocean Dumping
Act.

A close association between NOAA and EPA therefore was

necessary for effective implementation of this new policy.
Unfortunately, delays in the establishment of an official
relationship between NOAA and EPA headquarters stalled the
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necessary interaction.

Like NOAA's own program development

plan, it took nearly three years before the two agencies
were able to develop an interagency agreement outlining in
detail the steps each agency would take to satisfy their
responsibilities under the MPRSA.
Interagency agreements between bureaucratic units are
often important tools to help define their respective roles
in a policy area.

Bureaucracies, Edwards describes, are

often dependent on standard operating procedures (SOP's),
that is, internal responses developed because of a desire
for uniformity in the operation of complex and widely
dispersed organizations. 12

NOAA's interagency agreements

could be described as a form of SOP's since they establish
specific responsibilities, avenues of communication and
funding sources when working with other agencies.

While

SOP's can inhibit changes in policy or generate undesired
actions they are a necessary form of bureaucratic structure.
In NOAA's case the lack of an interagency agreement and the
bureaucratic steps necessary to establish one have both been
cause for inaction

13

While the establishment of the interagency agreement
developed some guidelines for continued interaction, basic
dispositional difficulties still existed between NOAA and
EPA.

Some authors describe this as a tendency of scientists

to focus on uncertainties which provide opportunities for
discovery, whereas the pUblic and managers tend to desire
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more certainty about their environment and in their
decisionmaking. 14

In this particular case it could be seen

as a sort of scientific disposition versus a regulatory
disposition.

NOAA's lack of support for EPA's decision to

move the 12-mile site out to 60 miles is an example of these
attitudes.

NOAA's policy, concurrent with the protectionist

attitude at the time, did not support possible contamination
of a relatively pristine area of the continental shelf.

Its

findings suggested no significant improvement in water
quality would result at the 12-mile site with the cessation
of sludge dumping only since the input of other contaminants
from the Hudson-Raritan estuary would continue.

Overall,

NOAA insisted that anticipated regulatory decisions should
be based on the best available scientific information. 15
EPA, while supporting this concept, was influenced by more
than purely scientific data.

The highly visual image of a

"sludge monster" devouring congested Long Island beaches was
but one of these influences, generating social and political
pressure and forcing EPA into decisions that may not have
completely considered the scientific realities.'6

While

NOAA's data was finally instrumental in EPA's decision not
to use the 60-mile site the whole process once again placed
NOAA in an defensive role and illustrated the difficulties
of integrating science into regulatory decisionmaking.
Another responsibility of the Ocean Dumping Act
(Section 203) which originally fell upon NOAA's shoulders
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was the exploration of alternatives to ocean dumping such as
recycling, new industrial processes, incineration, and other
forms of land disposal.

NOAA stated, however, that the

development of these technologies fell outside the
background, mission and competency of the agency.

Since

both the Corps of Engineers and EPA were already involved in
the research of alternatives any involvement by NOAA was
seen by the agency as duplicative.
resources for such an endeavor 1?

Besides, NOAA had no
This "disposition" , that

is, the perception that the search for alternatives was
outside it's primary mission, seemed to justify NOAA's
decision to remove itself from the obligation of the law.
In turn, it left in limbo one important aspect of the Ocean
Dumping Act, the exploration of means of minimizing or
ending all dumping of materials into the ocean.

MESA/NY Bight Project
NOAA's Marine Ecosystem Analysis Program (MESA) was
probably one of the most effective implementation tools
available to NOAA during the early years of the ocean
dumping issue.

Its well thought-out mission, its ability to

adapt to new directions and its tightly organized structure
were responsible for its success in providing a better
knowledge of the New York Bight and the impact of waste
disposal in it.
Unlike other programs in NOAA, MESA was blessed with an
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extensive development plan produced by Westinghouse Electric
Corporation. 18

This report detailed the scope of MESA and

provided a valuable foundation from which to build this
program.

In many ways this plan could be likened to a

standard operating procedure, providing specifics on the
program's management and scientific approaches and the
technical resources available.

The report went so far as to

outline each identified task with it's specific objective,
approach, list of recipients, relationship to other tasks
and it's start and end dates. 19
The MESA/NY Bight Project could be described as a
successful implementation tool because it avoided many of
the pitfalls outlined by Edwards.

To start, communications

were consistent and clear because it was a small, cohesive
group located at the site of the problem.

It's products

were applicable and readily available to the users, the
largest being the EPA.

The resources were already available

for the MESA program when it's focus was narrowed to ocean
dumping in the NY Bight.

It had talented people with the

proper skills for the tasks.

Because of it's close

proximity to the problem it received the information
necessary to function properly, either from EPA or from it's
supervised field work.

Because of NOAA's mandate under

MPRSA the program met an immediate need .

Probably most

important, however, was that the program generated quality
information that was used.
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other factors contributed to MESA's success.

The

differing viewpoints between NOAA and EPA common at the
headquarters level were mainly confined to Washington.

MESA

was able to maintain a fairly close working relationship
with EPA Region II throughout most of tenure.

MESA's

program development plan was not so restrictive or firmly
entrenched in the agency's infrastructure that the program
could not effectively pursue the new direction it was thrust
into at the beginning of the ocean dumping crisis.

Although

Edwards describes it as a pitfall, fragmentation may have
been a benefit for MESA.

The physical and bureaucratic

separation from NOAA headquarters may have isolated MESA
from some of the disruptive business of government.
Even in light of its accomplishments, however,
circumstances surrounding the success of the program may
have been partly responsible for the difficulties in policy
development and implementation that later contributed to
NOAA'S lack of presence in today's study of ocean waste

disposal.

Within two years of it's inception, MESA was

already considered the "expert" in the study of ocean
dumping in the New York Bight and it's data was used
extensively by EPA in it's regulatory decisions.

since

these regulations were under almost constant challenge
whenever they were at all controversial or went against
political desire or popular beliefs NOAA was often put in
the position of defending it's science to both a summoning
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Congress and an investigatory press.

Similarly, it's easy

accessibility to EPA, the pUblic and the media was
responsible for continually drawing NOAA into the ocean
dumping spotlight, a· fact that made people in NOAA
headquarters in Washington very uncomfortable.

According to

Dr. Larry Swanson, then director of the MESA/NY Bight
Project, most of NOAA's other programs and policies were
lacking in controversy leaving the agency both unprepared
for and extremely intimidated by the attention placed on
ocean dumping.

He fully believes that when the time came

for the NY Bight Project to end, NOAA officials "breathed a
sigh of relief".

He also saw the reorganization of MESA and

the physical move of the program as a "retreat" to
Washington, out of the limelight, so to speak, where it
could be better controlled by NOAA officials.

MESA's

incorporation into already existing programs seemed to mark
the beginning of the end of NOAA as a significant
contributor to both ocean dumping science and, ultimately,
policy decisions. 2o

Resources: Funding, Information, and Authority
Resources, or lack of them, have also played a
significant role in both the early development and continued
presence of NOAA in the ocean dumping policy process.

In

1972 the Ocean Dumping Act allowed a scant one million
dollars for the research necessary to support regulation of
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ocean dumping.

At this time NOAA asked the Department of

Commerce (DOC) for $4.1 million either as a supplemental
"add-on l l or amendment to the fiscal year 1974 congressional
submission, but was disapproved.

NOAA asked for no funding

under the Ocean Dumping Act in 1975.

In 1976, DOC approved

$2.0 million of a $5.7 million request by NOAA but the
Office of Management and BUdget (OMB) disallowed the funds.
Five years after the passage of the Ocean Dumping Act NOAA
requested and Congress finally approved $1.37 million as an
initial appropriation under the Act. 21

It was only then

that NOAA began the Ocean Dumping Program.
It is unclear whether lack of funds was the reason for
the failure to develop a specific NOAA program tasked to
meet the requirements of the Ocean Dumping Act or the lack
of programmatic development stymied the acquisition of funds
necessary to effectively carry out the legislative mandates.
What is clear is its detrimental effect on the acquisition
of the information necessary to support effective policy
implementation.
All work on ocean dumping research up to this point was
conducted using resources from other programs including
MESA, National Ocean Survey (NOS) and NMFS.

MESA resources

were directed to the immediate problems in the New York
Bight in the first five years (see discussion below) as a
result allowing NOAA to meet its requirements under the
Ocean Dumping Act.

However, dispositional issues and
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fragmentation of funding and information sources inhibited
further policy implementation, a consequence still felt
today.

For example, NOS conducted the early baseline

surveys at the 106-mile dumpsite which contained extensive
analyses of the chemical and physical properties of the
site, the office's area of expertise.

Only limited

information was included on the biological activity in the
region since this was not an NOS area of expertise.
Personnel within NMFS, at the time, were vehemently opposed
to ocean dumping and therefore did not support research
which was being conducted on the effects of ocean dumping
both at the 12 and 106-mile sites because it might be
construed as supporting continued dumping.

Dr. Robert

Edwards, director of the NMFS Northeast Fisheries Center,
was one of the most outspoken critics thinking NOAA should
not involve itself in dumping matters unless the agency's
position was strictly that of "no dumping".22
theory seems to

Edward's

explain the dynamics of this type of

situation:
"Different bureaucratic units are likely to have
different views on policies.
Intra- and interagency
disagreements inhibit cooperation and hinder
implementation. Within a single pOlicy area, each
relevant agency probably has different priorities,
different commitments, and different methods of
handling problems. Similar differences may arise
between those within different program responsibilities
within an agency. These differences are not conducive
to creating the mutual trust and close working
relationships that are freguently necessary for
effective implementation."
In reality, the consequences of such dispositions have
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had long-term ramifications.

While the baseline studies by

NOS at the 106-mile dumpsite continue to provide pertinent
information on the physical ocean such is not the case for
the biological ocean at the site.

In a recent statement to

a congressional hearing on amendments to the Ocean Dumping
Act NMFS admitted little information on benthic fauna in the
dumpsite region is available after 1976 and in-fact these
early measurements can only provide limited benchmark
information.

It went on to admit that these measurements

should have been accomplished prior to extensive dumping and
at continued intervals after the onset of dumping 24 •
The above examples show that important information may
not have been available for incorporation into the
decisionmaking process.

As policies within NOAA shifted

over time from protectionism to reappraisal and ultimately
to a benefit and risk assessment attitude, in line with
national policies, a greater burden has been placed on the
importance of information required to implement new
programs.

The greater use of the oceans for waste disposal

demands a better knowledge of the processes at work.
Edwards theory views authority as another important
resource in the implementation of policy.

Authority can

vary from program to program and comes in many different
forms:

the right to issue subpoenas, issue orders to other

officials, provide or withdraw funds from a program, or take
cases to court.

Implementation problems can exist when two
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agencies falling within the same jurisdiction have to share
authority.25

As provided by the Ocean Dumping Act, EPA

clearly maintains authority to issue permits and institute
regulations regarding ocean dumping.

It is less clear,

however, what role was played by the scientific information
and continued monitoring necessary to support those actions.
certainly during the MESA days NOAA's opinions were heavily
relied upon.

EPA's decision not to allow dumping at the 60-

Mile dumpsite based on NOAA's findings,

illustrates how

NOAA's scientific involvement affected policy and
regulations.

Clearly, the greater the role that scientific

information plays in the regulatory process the greater is
it's "authority".

While nowhere in the Ocean Dumping Act

was NOAA given any kind of mandated authority, a sense of
control may have developed as EPA decisions relied upon
NOAA'S scientific findings. 26

After the ocean dumping

program responsibilities moved to Washington, D.C. this
issue seemed to disappear probably due to the lack of '
cooperation between the two agencies at the headquarter
level.

NOAA Structure and Policies: 1977-1981
According to Edwards theory, the reorganization of
NOAA's ocean dumping programs from 1979 to 1981 could have
contributed significantly to policy implementation problems
within NOAA.

The incorporation of MESA into the Office of
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Marine Pollution Assessment (OMPA), the attempted move of
the ocean dumping program to the northwest, and the
subsequent reorganization of OMPA into the Oceans Assessment
Division quickly diluted a viable working program of ocean
dumping research.

While both of these pollution assessment

programs were NOAA's attempt to address broader ocean
pollution issues, the immersion of the ocean dumping
programs into the broader-based pollution programs was seen
by those within the organization as an attempt to distance
the agency from the immediate controversy of ocean dumping.
Edwards reasons that if the disposition of officials within
a bureaucracy is against a policy or the policy's
ramifications to that agency, effective implementation will
suffer.

If, in fact, as Dr. Swanson stated, the attention

NOAA was receiving regarding ocean dumping was intimidating
to the agency, a possible solution would be to lessen the
program's visibility.

The facts are that by 1982 no program

existed within NOAA that dealt exclusively with ocean
dumping.
In actuality, it is not clear what the motivation was
for the reorganization discussed above or the rapid
disappearance of an ocean dumping program within NOAA.
However, on a broader scale the whole time period from 1977
through 1982, when numerous changes in the Federal ocean
dumping policy were taking place, may have made it difficult
for NOAA to keep abreast of and respond to the events and
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decisions of the moment.

Edwards theorizes that

inconsistency in policy and implementation orders can
effectively inhibit the process and send mixed signals to
the agencies attempting to perform their roles.

The

established ocean dumping law (and one must assume, policy)
was made stronger by EPA and Congress in 1977 so that all
dumping that "unreasonably degraded" the oceans would end by
December 1981.

It was also hoped that this would provide an

added incentive to develop alternative disposal techniques.
It had an added effect, however. 27

At the same time as

seemingly restrictive measures were being taken at the
inshore dumpsite increased focus on the 106-Mile site as one
alternative to the inshore site was also taking place.
Camden, New Jersey was allowed to dispose of their municipal
waste at the 106-Mile site on an emergency basis and
industrial waste continued to be dumped at the site.

NOAA

involvement in the studies of each of these events produced
conclusions suggesting that the highly dispersive nature of
the site could accommodate the kinds and amounts of sludge
dumped at the 12-Mile site. 28

All this seemed to result in

NOAA finding itself supporting limited ocean dumping through
its research into ocean dumping effects all the while
favoring EPA's December 1981 deadline for the cessation of
sludge dumping.

A particular example, while perhaps

anecdotal, nevertheless illustrates the results of
inconsistent and unclear policymaking.
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In the first half of

1977 an internal memorandum from the Acting Administrator
for Marine Resources (dated May 20, 1977) titled "Is Ocean
Dumping Really That Bad" stated:
"Our position on this subject has always been that we
are supposed to be the protector of the oceans, but
this may not be reasonable if one takes a broader
context. How will New York city dispose of their
sewage sludge? Can they come up with a new plan in
four years? .. Suppose we take a position that ever~one
should dump sludge at the 106-Mile site? Why not? 9
Inexplicably, at the same time a NOAA issue paper dated May
3, 1977 intending to identify NOAA's policy on ocean
dumping, in part stated:
"It is NOAA's policy to oppose ocean disposal of sewage
sludge; the agency endorses EPA's pol icy to terminate
this dumping by 1981."~
Edwards policy implementation theory, applied to the
two major events in 1981 (namely the NACOA Report and the
"Sofaer Decision"), illustrates how these events affected
both the formulation of NOAA policy and, in turn, the
implementation of that policy.
Edwards discussion about unclear and inconsistent
policies is borne out in NACOA's report on ocean dumping:
" Because it is impossible to implement all five
statutes [namely Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
MPRSA, Safe Drinking Water Act, Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act and the Clean Air Act] simultaneously,
the implementation of each statute has shifted the
burden of receiving society's waste products to the
medium least regulated at the moment .... NACOA is
concerned that this medium-by-medium approach may have
produced groups of regulations whose primary objective
is to protect a particular medium from use as a waste
disposal medium, without any regard for the impact of
these regulations on other media. ,,31
If, in fact, this observation by NACOA was true it could
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have contributed to difficulties for NOAA (or any other
agency for that matter) involved in the implementation of
these laws.
The "Sofaer Decision,,32, for the purposes of this
discussion, serves to illustrate 1) the difficulties that
can be encountered by an agency attempting to translate the
language of laws into actions and 2) the role of the courts
in the policymaking process.
issues.

Edwards theory addresses both

In the first, he acknowledges that laws are often

unclear, sometimes leaving it up to the implementors to
determine the true intent of the law.

Sometimes, however,

the complexity of the issue warrants a certain vagueness.
He reasons:
"Neither executives nor legislators have the time or
expertise to develop and apply all the requisite
details for implementing policy. They have to leave
most (and sometimes all) of the details to
subordinates. ,,33
One of the major criticisms made by the "Sofaer Decision"
was EPA's interpretation of the language of the Ocean
Dumping Act, specifically, regarding sewage sludge which
"unreasonably degraded" the environment.

Discussions about

Judge Sofaer's decision argue that the law acknowledged
scientific and environmentally sensitive regulations were
necessary for proper implementation of the law and correctly
deferred that responsibility to EPA. 34

In the second

issue, Edwards states that the narrow definitions made by
the courts can significantly impact policy and, in turn, the
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respective implementation. 35

In this particular case,

while the court did not attempt to change the 1981 deadline
for the cessation of dumping, it did focus on EPA's
consideration of the factors involved in the issuance of
ocean dumping permits. 36

Of course, the results of the

court's rUling are well known.

NOAA Policy Issues from 1982 to the present
NOAA's policies in the 1980's certainly reflected the
realities of the law and emerging scientific conclusions
regarding expanded use of the oceans as a waste disposal
option.

The major policy reversal that oceans should not be

accorded a preferential treatment in waste management
decisions was ironically, for a time (in 1983), contrary to
EPA, who proposed special treatment for the ocean with
respect to other disposal media.

In general, though, there

was less problem with coordination between the respective
agencies in the 1980's although this may be reflective of
the fact that there was less coordination. 37
One problem area for NOAA throughout this period and,
most likely, throughout the whole twenty years of ocean
dumping history, was the definition of monitoring.

Similar

to the problems EPA encountered regarding the Ocean Dumping
Act's use of tbe term "unreasonable degradation", the law
did not clearly define what monitoring meant.

While NOAA

was charged with the responsibility of conducting
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comprehensive research and monitoring regarding the effects
of ocean dumping, in 1984, EPA contracted with Battelle
Ocean Services, a private ocean research firm, to conduct
research, in part to support it's ocean dumping permitting
process.

Discussions with people in EPA have indicated that

EPA employed Battelle because it was not receiving the
necessary information from NOAA.

The present contract

between EPA's Office of Estuarine Protection and Battelle is
for $48 million over three years, a substantial portion of
which goes directly toward monitoring and research at the
106-Mile site.~
After the reorganization of NOAA's ocean dumping and
marine pollution programs in 1981, the disposition within
the newly formed Ocean Assessment Division was that ocean
dumping was more of a political and social issue and less of
a scientific one.

The Status and Trends, Mussel Watch, and

other marine environmental monitoring programs, while
including the dumpsite areas, were concerned with nationwide data acquisition and analysis.

Consequently, little

more was done specific to ocean dumping in the New York
Bight.
The discussion/conclusions that follow will attempt to
summarize and coalesce the application of Edwards theory to
the events of the past twenty years.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
liThe history of evolving policy on ocean dumping by NOAA
reveals the workings of a federal agency attempting to
reconcile its views on protection of the ocean environment
with legislative mandates, new scientific findings, and the
realities of the given waste disposal situations.'
Philip Cohen
1986

The original premise of this paper that NOAA has not
met its responsibilities under the Ocean Dumping Act with
regard to ocean dumping research and monitoring is based on
three questions.
been shaped?

1) How have NOAA's ocean dumping policies

2) What difficulties have arisen in the

implementation of these policies?

3) How have these issues

shaped NOAA's present role in the ocean dumping situation?
NOAA's policies did not evolve in a void.

They were

concurrent with the three distinct phases of national
policies.

The first approached ocean disposal as a

temporary measure to be eliminated as soon as possible.
Political and social pressure notwithstanding, NOAA saw
itself as a protector of the ocean and its actions reflected
that attitude.

The second phase came about as the realities

of scientific evidence and the lack of practical
alternatives made ocean dumping more feasible for some
substances.

NOAA's decision to not exclude the ocean as a
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disposal medium under certain conditions was the third phase
and followed a national policy that waste management
decisions should be based on a reasonable and comprehensive
assessment of comparable benefits and risks.

With the

passage of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act, we have, perhaps,
returned to the original phase; non-use of the ocean for
waste disposal.

It is interesting to note that political

determinations were the framework for the decisions to "get
out of the ocean" while those of science found a place for
sewage sludge in the marine environment.
Neatly laying out the direction of policy over the
twenty years, while generically valid, does not include a
portrayal of the often difficult implementation process
associated with policies.

George Edwards emphasized an

explanation of the factors that adversely affect policy
implementation.

This paper, in turn, identifies the

problems associated with the particulars of NOAA's attempts
at implementation and, in effect, overlays them onto Edwards
theory.
While all four factors in Edwards theory have played a
role in this discussion, communication and disposition
problems have most significantly affected the direction of
implementation.

The Ocean Dumping Act assigns NOAA three

responsibilities: 1) monitoring the effects of waste dumped
into the ocean, 2) conducting research programs on longrange effects of pollution and human-induced changes on the
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marine environment, and 3) the search for alternatives.

In

the early years (1970-1972) NOAA's research plans focused on
ecosystem-wide studies into the effects of human activities
on coastal waters. However, vague ocean dumping policies
made it difficult for the newly-formed NOAA to respond to
the growing ocean dumping crisis.

After 1972, more specific

studies at the 12-mile dumpsite were the major focus of
NOAA's research.

Much of this work was in response to

sludge-induced crises, real or imagined.

The understanding

of the dynamics of the New York Bight by MESA/NY Bight
Project was an added benefit received by the monitoring
activities of ocean dumping.

within the realm of policy,

the Ocean Dumping Act established a statutory-based national
pOlicy with a fair amount of discretion accorded to the
implementing agencies.

In 1974, NOS conducted the first in

series of studies (often referred to as baseline studies) at
the 106-mile site.

Most research was still specific to

montoring of ocean dumping.

This continued until the

reorganization of NOAA ocean dumping and marine pollution
programs in 1981.

However, dispositional difficulties

between and within agencies, along with unclear policies,
provided roadblocks.
It is the period after 1982 that seems to mark the end
of NOAA's ocean dumping-specific monitoring/research
programs.

In NOAA's Ocean Assessment Division FY 1986
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Report to Congress on Ocean Pollution, Monitoring, and
Research they state:
"During the past year the OAD program has continued to
develop the operational capabilities necessary for
analysis of marine and estuarine environmental quality
problems in a national context.
It has directed NOAA's
environmental quality assessment and monitoring efforts
toward coastal and estuarine areas where problems are
more immediate than in the open ocean." [emphasis from
quoted text]
A thorough search of literature revealed no other ocean
dumping studies performed by NOAA either site or activity
specific until 1987 when the 12-mile dumpsite recovery study
by NMFS was undertaken.

Of all studies related to or in the

vicinity of the 106-mile dumpsite conducted after 1984 none
was either sponsored or performed by NOAA.

The studies that

only incidentally incorporated the dumpsites into the
overall sampling strategy, such as MARMAP, NEMP, and status
and Trends were essentially ecosystem-wide monitoring plans.
Ocean dumping influences were considered as only one of the
many pollutant inputs studied.
There is not a clear picture as to whether NOAA failed
in its ocean dumping mandate in some way.

Its original

intent in 1972 with the creation of MESA was to conduct
"ecosystem-wide" research, by including all the factors that
influence the health of a system.

The agency's present-day

programs are similar in that respect.

NOAA is, in fact,

fUllfilling that part of its ocean dumping mandate that
instructs it to conduct long-term research into man's impact
on the marine environment.

However, insofar as NOAA has
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removed itself from the monitoring of ocean dumping, it has
not seemed to have lived up to its mandate.

The

acknowledged lack of information regarding benthic fauna,
the non-existence of any recent dumpsite stUdies, and EPA's
employment of Battelle to conduct it's research in support
of the permitting process all seem to support this premise.
There is renewed interest by NOAA in the deepwater
dumpsite since the passage of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of
1988.

A cynical person might suggest that this interest

sterns from the large influx of money as a result of the
dumper's user fees.

A hopeful person might believe that

this represents a golden opportunity to delve deeper into a
relatively unknown area.

It might be suggested there are

certain realities to both.

NOTES
1.
from "NOAA Policies" p. 10.
This seems to summarize the
difficulties facing NOAA as a scientific agency. It seemed like an
appropriate quote for the conclusion.
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